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WHY DID PEOPLE STOP COMMITTING
CRIMES? AN ESSAY ABOUT
CRIMINOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY
George L. Kelling*
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, to virtually everyone's surprise, a lot of people stopped
committing crimes. Although the media first noted sharp declines
in crime in New York City, it was not long before it recognized
similar reductions in criminal activity in other cities as well. This
trend was observed not only in wealthy cities like Boston and San
Diego, but also in relatively impoverished cities like Newark and
New Orleans-albeit somewhat later.
These declines in crime were so steep and unprecedented that
they stunned not just the general public, but criminologists, soci-
ologists, and political scientists throughout the world. Many of
these social scientists had predicted that demographic trends-
more young people in the population-would drive crime upward
to new levels. Today, virtually no one denies that crime has
dropped. The question is, "Why?" Obviously, something signifi-
cant happened to cause so many people to stop committing crime
in so short a period-in many cities, crime dropped to 1960s levels
in a matter of a few years.
One would like to believe that some objective, "scientific" expla-
nation could account for why people stopped committing crime.
Alas, despite the tag "science" in social science, ideology too often
shapes the social scientists' responses to such questions: conserva-
tives tend to find their answers in new policing strategies, imprison-
ment, and changes in culture and values; liberals, their answers in
the economy, demographic changes, gun control, and changing pat-
terns of drug use.
In an absolute sense-a scientific sense-neither the question of
why crime declined in New York City nor why crime declined na-
tionally, is answerable. Any explanations are strictly post hoc.
* Dr. George L. Kelling is currently a professor at the Rutgers University School
of Criminal Justice, a Research Fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government, and a Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Dr. Kelling
received a B.A. from St. Olaf College, an M.S.W. from the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee, and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
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Whatever happened in New York City, or Boston, or San Diego
that caused people to stop committing crime has already happened
and no scientific measurement system was in place to record it. At
best, we can reconstruct the history of events, use whatever data
are available, check plausible interpretations, and select what
seems to be the most credible explanation.
Though the question, "Why is crime dropping in America," is
unanswerable, some criminologists and economists like to make it
appear that they can provide answers.' The competing explana-
tions-imprisonment, police practices, the economy, demography,
drug markets, gun control, or combinations of these factors-all
have their advocates and some fairly reasonable arguments can be
developed on behalf of each explanation. The difficulty with these
"macro" interpretations, however, is that they assume that such po-
tential causes of crime reduction operate uniformly in communities
across the country. This assumption is unfounded.
For example, some crime reductions of the latter half of the past
decade appear to be correlated with improved economic condi-
tions. Note the word "correlated." It may be true that improved
economic conditions in some communities resulted in jobs for un-
employed youths who would have otherwise committed crimes.2
But it also may be true that in other communities, reduced levels of
crime have contributed to improved economic conditions. Once
citizens, neighborhood institutions, and police regain control over
public spaces, local commerce can again develop and thrive. In
New York City, areas of Harlem and the Bronx that were once
written off as uninhabitable, but today include thriving commercial
centers, are prime examples of this phenomenon.
Likewise, anyone who has observed police practices understands
that they operate very differently depending upon the neighbor-
hood and community in which they are implemented. For exam-
ple, practices that were routine in Milwaukee during the 1970s
would have been completely unacceptable in New York City dur-
ing the same period. 3 Even imprisonment can affect neighbor-
1. See generally THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel
Wallman eds., 2000) (containing essays purporting to explain the nationwide reduc-
tion in crime).
2. The suggestion put forth by some-that enough New York City drug dealers
went to work at, say, McDonald's to cause the declines in crime-is pretty far-fetched.
3. In Milwaukee during this era, police adamantly refused to meet with citizen or
neighborhood groups. To police leaders, their business was just that-police business.
While police in many other cities may not have been enthusiastic about meeting with
citizens, especially those from minority neighborhoods, few would have been in a po-
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hoods differently. Taking five offenders out of a neighborhood and
imprisoning them could reduce crime substantially in one neigh-
borhood, have no impact on another, and lead to increases in crime
in yet a third.4
In other words, social conditions, policies, and practices interact
with cities, communities, and neighborhoods in very different ways.
Consequently, the only question that can really be asked and an-
swered sincerely is: "Why did people commit fewer crimes in
neighborhood X or community Y?"
The problem for social scientists is that there are no easy ways to
study such neighborhood interactions and attribute causality. To
do so, one first has to spend a lot of time in neighborhoods and
cities, often in quite dangerous locations, collecting an assortment
of disparate data. Then one must make comparisons to broader
economic and demographic statistics-much of it outdated or not
broken down by neighborhood. Even when these tasks are com-
pleted, however, the findings for New York City may have no rele-
vance for, say, Hoboken, New Jersey, which probably has an
entirely different social structure and culture. Few social scientists
bother to conduct the necessary fieldwork. How much easier, in-
stead, to download aggregate Uniform Crime Reports from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation5 and correlate them with widely
available economic and labor data. The simple reality is, however,
that when inferring about crime, the farther one is from the
ground, the less reliable the inference. If criminological research
has demonstrated anything over the past forty years, it is that the
"crime problem" that drives public concern is a local problem, only
understandable within a local context.
"RoOT CAUSES" AND CRIME CONTROL POLICY
In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice put forward the idea
that crime is caused by poverty, racism, and social injustice-the
litical climate that would have allowed them to maintain the stance of police in
Milwaukee.
4. For example, in some relatively stable neighborhoods, the older criminals keep
the younger ones in check.
5. E.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1999:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (2000). For each of the annual Uniform Crime Reports
since 1995, see http://www.fbi.gov/ucr.htm. Searching this web site is an invariably
easier and safer exercise than tabulating data in the streets of a high-crime area be-
cause it can be completed in the privacy of one's own home.
20001
570 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
so-called root causes of crime.6 According to this view, crime pre-
vention occurs through amelioration of these social problems.
Therefore, the only role of police and criminal justice agencies is to
process offenders through the criminal justice system, responding
to crime after it occurs. Directly reflecting the underlying assump-
tions of the 1960s' War on Poverty, these ideas shaped conven-
tional thinking about crime and its control until the early 1990s.
Moreover, this model became the foundation for the criminological
educational enterprise that developed during the 1970s in universi-
ties throughout the country, much of it supported by federal fund-
ing. That crime was caused by poverty, racism, and social injustice
came close to being the official criminological position about the
etiology of crime and, by extension, its solution.
At the time, the police establishment was not terribly enthusias-
tic about many aspects of the Commission's report. Nevertheless,
the report's call for decriminalizing petty offenses such as drunken-
ness, and its endorsement of the idea that "victimless" crimes such
as prostitution should be largely ignored by police, if not
decriminalized, were congruent with the reform movement within
policing. For a variety of reasons, among them corruption and po-
litical entanglements,7 police departments by the 1960s had en-
trenched strategies that sought to limit their attention to the
"serious" crimes of murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary.
In attempts to further efficiency, increase control of line officers,
and heighten the focus on serious crimes, police leaders systemati-
cally removed officers from activities such as foot patrol, which ex-
posed them to extensive contact with citizens. All of this was
crystallized brilliantly in Sergeant Friday's "Just the facts Ma'am"
approach to law enforcement.8 It became accepted that the busi-
ness of police was to respond to serious crime after it occurred and
to arrest and process offenders. Furthermore, minor offenses and
juvenile offending, unless serious, were to be the province of social
6. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY V (1967) (making more than 200 recom-
mendations that the Commission believed were "concrete steps" that could lead to a
"safer and more just society").
7. E.g., George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing,
PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING (Nat'l Inst. of Just. et al. eds, Nov. 1988). While the politi-
cal entanglements of police departments is a long story, during much of the nine-
teenth and early years of the twentieth centuries, the links between police and urban
leaders ("ward bosses") were so close that the police in many communities were al-
most an extension of the political machines. Id. at 4-5.
8. The reference is to Jack Webb's portrayal of Sergeant Joe Friday in the televi-
sion show Dragnet, which aired from 1952-59 and 1967-70.
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workers, not police. Civil libertarians applauded this view as unin-
trusive policing, endorsing the police retreat from minor and juve-
nile offenses, and supporting the idea that police should remain in
their cars and respond only to serious crimes. At base, civil liber-
tarians argued for police to use state authority sparingly. Other
advocates, promoting and ultimately realizing limitations on insti-
tutionalization, also called for similar restraint toward the emotion-
ally disturbed for all but imminently violent individuals.
Meanwhile, crime levels varied considerably during the 1970s
and 1980s, with the overall trend moving up and violent crime
reaching its highest peak in most communities during the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Moreover, fear of crime, with its attendant conse-
quences-citizens avoiding public spaces and facilities, abandoning
certain urban neighborhoods or cities altogether, isolating them-
selves in their homes, and purchasing security hardware such as
guns and dogs-remained consistently high following the 1960s.
And as noted above, by the late 1980s, many criminologists were
predicting a new and even fiercer crime wave looming as a conse-
quence of a large cohort of youth entering their crime-prone
teens.9
How "ROOT CAUSES" REASONING SHAPED EXPLANATIONS FOR
CRIME DROPS IN NEW YORK Crr
In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani, a brash center-right Republican who
promised to reduce crime and ran against "squeegee men,"'1 was
elected mayor of the Democratic city of New York. Within months
after Giuliani and his first Police Commissioner, William Bratton,
took office, unprecedented declines in crime were recorded, espe-
cially for violent crimes such as murder, aggravated assault, and
robbery. Criminologists and the liberal media were caught off
guard. The question raged: "Why is crime dropping in New York
City?" Aside from Giuliani and Bratton's claim that the police
were largely responsible, four general contentions developed to ex-
plain the decline in crime: (1) the New York City Police Depart-
ment ("NYPD") was "cooking the books"; (2) the economy was
improving, causing drug dealers to enter the world of legitimate
work; (3) drug use patterns were changing, including a decline in
9. E.g., JAMES ALAN Fox, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIO-
LENCE: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CURRENT AND
FUTURE RATES OF JUVENILE OFFENDING (1996).
10. "Squeegee men" are intimidating individuals who "wash" windows of cars
stopped at traffic lights and demand fees for their services.
2000]
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the use of crack cocaine; and (4) demographic shifts led to fewer
youths in the population.
The first open debate about the issue took place at the 1995
meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Commissioner
Bratton addressed the group, putting forth a simple explanation:
"Police can control people. In New York City we have. People
have changed their behavior."11 For the most part, criminologists
responded skeptically. For example, a panel comprised of crimi-
nologists and economists from John Jay College of Criminal Justice
described their examination of every economic variable that could
explain the decline in crime. Their conclusion? None of the fac-
tors explained the decline in crime-therefore, hidden economic
variables, not yet discovered, must explain them.
One troubling new contention also emerged, that police could
indeed reduce crime, but only at the unacceptable cost of harass-
ment and brutality, especially in dealing with minorities. This be-
lief soon became entangled with New York's racial politics, so that
the crime reductions were attributed to the police department's
"scorched earth policies," "broad sweeps," "zero tolerance," and
other draconian police tactics. Two terrible incidents later fueled
those charges: the police torture of a Haitian immigrant 12 and the
police shooting of an unarmed African man forty-one times.13 Un-
doubtedly, those events contributed to negative explanations for
crime reduction. Yet, as tragic as they were, they were tragedies,
not trends.
When it became clear that crime was dropping in cities such as
Boston and San Diego as well, the question changed from "Why is
crime declining in New York City?" to "Why is crime dropping in
America?" Even then, however, New York City remained a spe-
cial case. For example, Fox Butterfield of The New York Times
annually writes "bad" New York and "good" Boston and San Di-
ll. Clifford Krauss, The Commissioner vs. the Criminologists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1995, at 43 (chronicling a meeting between Commissioner Bratton and eminent
criminologists).
12. United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also David
Barstow, The Louima Case: The Overview; Officer, Seeking Some Leniency, Admits to
Louima's Torture, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at Al (reporting Office Justin A.
Volpe's decision to plead guilty to the brutal sodomizing torture of Abner Louima in
a New York City police station).
13. E.g., Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shoot-
ing are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2000, at Al ("The verdict came
down in a tense and racially charged case that led to anti-police demonstrations, ar-
rests, and a reorganization of the department's Street Crime Unit, to which the of-
ficers belonged.").
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ego stories. 4 According to this scenario, New York got its results
by means of "bad cops" harassing citizens, especially minorities,
while in Boston and San Diego, "good cops" solved problems and
worked closely with citizens to reduce crime. Even social scientists
with little knowledge or contact with the NYPD held up the Bos-
ton Police Department as a model for the NYPD to emulate.15
Even the United States Commission on Civil Rights contrasted
New York with Boston and San Diego, suggesting that crime re-
ductions in New York "come at a significant cost to the vulnerable
communities in greatest need of police protection." 16 This, despite
the fact that in 1999 shootings of civilians in New York were at the
lowest recorded levels ever and compared favorably with virtually
every city in the United States.1 7
One possible explanation for why overall trends in crime reduc-
tion were obscured by a focus on a small number of negative
events is that both political enemies of Mayor Giuliani and liberal
social scientists rejected the underlying ideas that shaped New
York's "theory of action." Both Giuliani, and later Commissioner
Bratton, adopted a strategy whose origins lay in the center-right of
academic thought on criminal justice policing. James Q. Wilson
and George L. Kelling's 1982 Atlantic Monthly article The Police
and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows was the source.1 8 The
14. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-
Style Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al (describing successful efforts by cities
to reduce crime). But c.f, Heather Mac Donald, America's Best Urban Police Force,
CITY J., Summer 2000, at 14-31 (criticizing Butterfield's attack on New York police as
inaccurate).
15. E.g., Orlando Patterson & Christopher Winship, Boston's Police Solution,
N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1999, at Al (noting that Boston was forced to terminate stop
and frisk policies because of outrage among African Americans in the city). Both the
Boston and San Diego Police Departments deserve all credit they get. They, like the
NYPD, have been national leaders in police innovation-Boston for its work with
neighborhoods and communities and San Diego for its problem-solving approach to
policing.
16. Heather Mac Donald, NY Press to NYPD: Drop Dead, AM. ENTER., Sept. 1,
2000, at 16 (discussing hypocrisy of New York media in berating the police for going
soft on crime while simultaneously criticizing harsh effects of more assertive police
measures).
17. Panel Urges Remedies to Abuses by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2000, at A18. It
is important to note that comparative data on police shootings are unreliable because
police departments have not agreed upon national standards for data collection.
Moreover, many departments are reluctant to make data about police shootings
public.
18. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety:
Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/crime/windows.htm. This article coined the term "Bro-
ken Windows."
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Broken Windows theory argues that disorderly behavior and con-
ditions, such as broken windows left untended, send a message that
nobody in a community cares, leading to fear of crime, more seri-
ous crime itself, and, eventually, urban decay. Such reasoning is a
direct challenge not only to many liberal policy innovations-
decriminalization of minor and so-called victimless crimes, deinsti-
tutionalization of the emotionally disturbed, and deregulation of
the youthful misconduct in schools and public spaces-but to
"root-causes" theory itself. If the logic of Broken Windows is true,
restoring and maintaining order will prevent the eruption of more
serious crime. As Bratton put it, once people know their obstrep-
erous and minor offenses will be controlled, many will change their
behavior.19
WHAT DID HAPPEN IN NEW YORK CITY?
The story of New York's reduction in crime could start in a vari-
ety of places: with the concern for ending disorder in mid-town
Manhattan and the evolution of the Mid-Town Manhattan Com-
munity Court;2  with the eradication of graffiti in the subway sys-
tem;2 with the reclaiming of Bryant Park (adjacent to the New
York Public Library); with the political decision of former Mayor
David Dinkins to add 6000 new police officers to the NYPD during
the early 1990s; with the evolution of Business Improvement Dis-
tricts, especially the Grand Central Partnership that restored con-
trol over the neighborhood surrounding Grand Central Station;
with Commissioner Raymond Kelly's decision to devise a plan to
reign in "squeegee men" (although Giuliani and Bratton got credit
for eliminating squeegee men, the plans to deal with them were
developed under Commissioner Kelly); or with neighborhood or-
ganizations that demanded throughout the 1970s and 1980s that
something be done to address crime and disorder in their
communities.
19. James Traub, New York Story, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 27, 1997, at 12 (discussing
anti-drug initiatives in Washington Heights that led to a reduction in violence).
20. E.g., Joseph P. Fried, Court is Moving Back Into the Neighborhood, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, § 1, at 45 (discussing the successes of community courts as well
as the opening of a new facility in Red Hook, Brooklyn); Matthew T. Crossnon, Third
Branch of Government Deserves Fair Share of Budget, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 1993, at S1
(discussing functions and operation of Midtown Manhattan Community Court).
21. George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' View
of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1220-21 (1998)
(stating that the eradication of subway graffiti "was considered by some to be one of
the most successful urban policy 'wins' on record") [hereinafter Declining Crime
Rates].
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All were important moves to reassert control over the city.
Many grew out of the same concerns that characterized Broken
Windows. In fact, business people in mid-town Manhattan had
been clamoring for restoration of order in the Times Square area
since the 1970s-articulating the Broken Windows thesis even
before Broken Windows had been written. At the same time,
crime was slowly declining in the years prior to the Giuliani admin-
istration. This is neither surprising nor inconsistent with evidence
that the NYPD played a key role in the dramatic crime reductions
of the Giuliani-Bratton era.
The starting point of the New York story of crime reduction
most directly linked to the Giuliani administration was the effort to
restore order in the subway system. As New Yorkers will recall, by
the late 1980s the subway environment was out of control. Despite
the virtual elimination of graffiti by 1989,22 conditions were so bad
that citizens were abandoning the subway in droves. A quarter of a
million passengers a day didn't bother to pay their fare; extortion
of money from passengers via aggressive panhandling was the rule
of the day; robberies were increasing; and things were worsening
fast. The "official" New York Times spin on all this was that the
problem was homelessness23-an interpretation supported by
homeless advocacy groups and the New York City Civil Liberties
Union.24 An initial attempt to restore order was flagging under
vitriolic media and legal attacks by advocacy groups, primarily as a
result of a lack of police leadership-transit police were simply too
busy with "serious crime" to bother with things like disorder and
fare evasion. In response, Robert Kiley, then chairman of the
board of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, bypassed the
president of the New York Transit Authority and insisted that Wil-
liam Bratton be hired as chief of the Transit Police Department.2 5
In certain respects, the terms of Bratton's hiring were unusual.
Given the root-causes paradigm, chiefs generally were recruited for
a variety of reasons: to resolve a scandal; to improve relations with
the community, especially with minorities; or to run departments
22. Id.
23. E.g., Kirk Johnson, Officials Debate How to Get Homeless out of Subways,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1988, § 1, at 23 (discussing the sypathetic posture of the Transit
Authority toward the necessary removal of homeless people from the subways with-
out violating their civil rights).
24. Declining Crime Rates, supra note 21, at 1221 (discussing New York Civil Lib-
erties Union's view that the problem "was 'homelessness' and homelessness was not
the TPD's [Transit Police Department's] problem").
25. WILLIAM BRAT-ON & PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 140-142 (1998).
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more efficiently. Although crime might be mentioned during the
search process for a new chief (disorder probably was not), crime
reduction was far from the top of the list of expectations. As much
as anything, many mayors simply wanted police to stay out of
trouble and not rock political or ideological boats. Kiley's expecta-
tions of Bratton, however, were different and explicit: regain con-
trol over the subway and assure passengers that they were safe. In
turn, Bratton had a specific vision of how this could be accom-
plished. First, he had an idea, a guiding theory of action: Broken
Windows. Second, Bratton is an administrative maven. By the
time he got to the transit police he had already headed three police
departments and viewed himself as a "fixer" of badly run
organizations.26
Bratton, however, was out of step with most other police admin-
istrators in two ways: first, he believed that police organizations
could be turned around very quickly; second, he saw mid-level
managers as the key to reforming police departments. Regarding
the former, many academics and police chiefs were saying that
changing police organizations was a slow and tedious process last-
ing as long as ten years. For Bratton, this was unacceptable. He
wanted and promised results quickly. Regarding mid-level manag-
ers, the dominant view in policing was that they, police unions, and
civil service rules were the three primary impediments to police
improvements. While Bratton may have shared that view of un-
ions and civil service, his view of mid-level managers was exactly
the opposite. For him, these managers needed a clear and explicit
mandate, measurable objectives, resources to achieve those objec-
tives, and the need to be held strictly accountable for accomplish-
ing them. Within months after Bratton was hired, the transit police
restored order. Fare evasion dropped to a fraction of what it had
been and robberies steadily declined as well.27 Today, more than
6,000,000 passengers a day ride the subway28 and disorder, fear,
and crime are no longer problems.
The reform of policing New York's subway system was the first
real test of the Broken Windows hypothesis. It also demonstrated
26. E.g., Clifford Krauss, Bratton Builds his Image as he Rebuilds the Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, § 1, at 1 (stating that even Bratton's critics "concede that he has
a special ability to innovate and motivate").
27. BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 25, at 180 (noting that crime statistics since
Bratton's two years as commissioner included a 22% decline in felony crime, a 40%
decline in robberies, and a 50% reduction in fare evasion).
28. ABOUT NYC TRANSIT, at http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/nyct/facts/ffintro.htm (last
visited on Nov. 20, 2000).
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that criminal justice organizations could be turned around quickly
with proper leadership. By any standard, it was one of the most
impressive public policy turnarounds in memory. For good or ill,
the turnaround in New York itself eventually overshadowed the
changes in the subway.
In many respects, the New York story is a replay of the subway
story. Mayor Giuliani inherited a political mandate to reduce
crime and, like Kiley, was specific about what he wanted in a police
commissioner. An advocate of Broken Windows himself, Giuliani
recruited Bratton as commissioner on the basis of his subway suc-
cess and their shared views: both believed that crime could be re-
duced, not just a little, but a lot; and swiftly to boot.
What actually happened in the NYPD was far more complicated
than what happened in the Transit Police. The size of the NYPD
alone was daunting-almost ten times the size of the Transit Police,
which, with almost 4000 officers, is among the largest five or six
departments in the country. The crime problems were more com-
plex-crime in the subway consists of a relatively narrow set of
crimes. Further, the NYPD was a troubled organization. It had
been in a muddle for two decades. Preoccupation with corruption
had changed how the police department conceived of its business.
It came to believe its business was staying out of trouble and re-
sponding to crimes after they were committed. Out of fear of cor-
ruption, police officers were even forbidden to make arrests for
drug deals that went on right under their noses.
Yet Bratton went into the NYPD, as he did the Transit Police
Department, with both plans of action and management, and again
"called his shots." He was going to reduce crime; not by the single
digits of three or four percent that had characterized recent years,
but by double digits.
The plan of action was, of course, more inclusive than just imple-
mentation of Broken Windows. Every tactical aspect of policing
came under review, from investigations to warrant service. Yet a
basic commitment to restoring order in New York remained. As
interesting, and ultimately as consequential, was Bratton's cer-
tainty that middle managers were the key to turning around the
NYPD. Everything in his Transit experience strengthened this
conviction. The question was how to make his approach work in a
department with seventy-six precincts. The kind of personal direc-
tion that he provided in Transit's twelve districts was simply impos-
sible in New York's seventy-six precincts-each of which has a
2000]
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higher average population 29 or more total police officers than most
American cities.
The answer that evolved in the NYPD was Compstat, an organi-
zational process in which precinct data and accountability were
linked and translated into action.3 ° The singular achievement of
Compstat, one that revolutionized the NYPD, was that it riveted
precinct commanders' attention on precinct problems. Prior to
Compstat, precinct commanders were preoccupied with two things:
what was going on at One Police Plaza (the NYPD's central head-
quarters), and staying out of trouble. Now their careers rested on
knowing their precincts, understanding problems there, and doing
something about them. Compstat was the means by which a rigid
and highly centralized bureaucracy, in a matter of months, was
transformed into a decentralized and highly responsive organiza-
tion. The speed of organizational change was unprecedented in
policing.
The result of these efforts, to use Malcolm Gladwell's phrase,
was a "tipping point."'3 1 Crime plummeted. Did the economy
cause the change? During Bratton's administration, unemploy-
ment never went below 8.7 %.32 Did the number of youths in the
city's population change? No data support this. Did drug use pat-
terns change? Perhaps somewhat, although the evidence is weak.33
Besides, which came first, changes in drug use patterns or new po-
lice activities? One must ignore history and believe in some in-
credible coincidences to deny police a major portion of the credit
for what happened in New York. Kiley first, and then Giuliani and
Bratton, called their shots very specifically. Those attributing the
29. New York City's population of 7,430,000 divided by the number of precincts
yields an average of approximately 98,000 people per police precinct, just under the
threshold of 100,000 that signifies a "large city" in the United States. See DEP'T OF
CITY PLANNING, CITY OF N.Y., POPULATION BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: NEW
YORK CITY AND BOROUGHS 1990 AND 1999 (ESTIMATE), available at http://
www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/dcp/pdf/9099pop.pdf; see also Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 637 (1996) (noting that what
people call "big city" police departments typically serve 100,000 people or more).
30. See BRATTON & KNOBLER, supra note 25, at 233 (explaining the evolution of
"the crime meetings" into computer-statistics meetings, or Compstat).
31. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTrLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). Gladwell, a staff writer for The New Yorker, examines how
major societal changes can often occur without warning and have far-reaching effects.
32. N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP'T, NEW YORK CITY CRIME CONTROL INDICATORS &
STRATEGY ASSESSMENT 41 (1998) (indicating unemployment statistics for New York
City).
33. Clifford Krauss, Crime Lab: Mystery of New York, The Suddenly Safer City,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1995, at 1.
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crime reductions to the economy, etc., simply have no data that
support their point of view. Moreover, with the exception of Pro-
fessor Eli Silverman of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, who
studied Compstat in considerable detail,34 no scholars who have
written about the crime drops in New York have done research in
the police department itself.35
The question remains, however: "Why did crime drop so much in
so many locations, virtually simultaneously?"
How CAN WE THINK ABOUT WHY PEOPLE STOPPED
COMMITTING CRIME IN OTHER CITIES AS WELL?
A broad consensus is emerging among social scientists that three
factors drove the outbreak of violence during the 1980s and early
1990s: the post-1985 "crack" epidemic, the proliferation of hand-
guns among youths, and competition among gangs and youths for
drug "turf"-competition that was resolved by intimidation and
killing.36 At one level, those are entirely plausible explanations: in
city after city, the appearance of crack was followed by turf battles,
and they were resolved by violence, most often gun-related
violence.
But attributing the epidemic of violence to crack, guns, and com-
petition for turf, begs the larger issue. Drugs of one kind or an-
34. ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTrLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN PO-
LICING (1999) (attributing much of New York City's crime reduction to those innova-
tions developed by Bratton in 1994).
35. E.g., John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced
Violent Crime?, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 207-65. Eck and
Maguire discuss New York City at great length. They immediately inject ideology into
the discussion by presenting New York under the rubric "Zero Tolerance"-a phrase
loved by the left as a substitute for Broken Windows because it both smacks of zeal-
otry and suggests blind non-discretionary policing. Never mind that the phrase is ab-
solutely inconsistent with everything that Wilson, Kelling, and Coles ever wrote about
Broken Windows. We always have presented order maintenance as a highly discre-
tionary set of activities. Moreover, Bratton has explicitly rejected "Zero Tolerance" as
descriptive of his approach (except for dealing with police corruption). Certainly Eck,
an accomplished police scholar, is well aware of this. Then, Eck and Maguire proceed
by offering critiques of Broken Windows, virtually all of which are non-empirical ide-
ological essays rather than articles that would constitute serious research. (I have no
quarrel with ideological essays as long as authors make it clear that they are writing
ideological essays-even if they include numbers.) They then move on to Compstat,
indicating that while there are plausible reasons to think that Compstat might have
had an impact, it probably did not. They draw this conclusion after limiting their anal-
ysis to homicides and without ever visiting an NYPD precinct.
36. E.g., Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, The Recent Rise and Fall of American
Violence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 1, at 1-12 (discussing a myriad
of possibilities to explain the reduction of violent crime in America).
2000]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
other have been around for a long time. An illegal market in drugs
has existed during most of the twentieth century.37 Why did illegal
marketing turn so violent after 1985? The answer most often given
is the proliferation of guns. But guns have been around a long
time, too. There have always been ample guns obtainable, whether
legally or illegally. If anything, 1980s gun control measures should
have made them harder to obtain. True, in prior decades their fire-
power may not have been as great, but they were deadly enough.
And youths have been with us forever-maybe not as the same
share of the population, but still in significant enough numbers to
raise havoc if not controlled. What happened to cause parents,
neighborhoods, communities, and cities to lose control of their
young people? Why, as they had in the past, couldn't communities
absorb the guns, drugs, and youth and prevent disorder, crime, and
violence? Answering those questions might inform the solution to
the riddle of why crime is declining nationally.
Starting during the 1950s and 1960s, three broad trends reduced
the capacity of neighborhoods and communities to control them-
selves and their youth. First, urban renewal, expressway construc-
tion, and bussing tore apart neighborhoods, especially inner-city
neighborhoods. Second, the institutional controls that traditionally
regulated youthful behavior were weakened and undermined in
the name of the "rights" of youth, decriminalization, and deinstitu-
tionalization. Finally, criminal justice agencies and police depart-
ments abandoned traditional peacekeeping and order maintenance
and withdrew into highly centralized facilities and strategies.
Urban renewal and highway construction cut through neighbor-
hoods and communities with little regard for the social conse-
quences. Entire neighborhoods in many areas and fragments of
other neighborhoods were bulldozed, either to make room for new
"tower block" public housing or expressways. Poor inner-city re-
sidents, often African Americans, were displaced into adjacent
neighborhoods. Resistance to African Americans moving into
white neighborhoods was often fierce, but their advance was inevi-
table-they had to go someplace. "Blockbusting" and "redlining"
followed, reducing property values and opening the way to absen-
tee landlords.
Public housing, rather than providing housing for the working
poor-giving them a boost until they could enter the private mar-
37. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
107 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the origin of the illegal drug market in New York during
the early twentieth century).
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ket-became the housing of last resort for the most troubled and
troublesome citizens. By the 1980s, such housing became the nur-
series in which babies (early-teen mothers) raised babies. Stores
and shops abandoned those areas, depriving neighborhoods of the
"ownership" that was essential to maintaining control of public
spaces. Jane Jacobs predicted all of this as early as 1962 in her
classic The Death and Life of Great American Cities.38 Gone as
well were the convenience and jobs they provided neighborhood
residents. And, during the 1960s and 1970s, bussing, whatever the
motivations of its advocates, further weakened the bonds of fami-
lies to neighborhoods. Those who could, moved or sent their chil-
dren to private schools. As children were withdrawn from the
streets on which they once had walked to public schools, their par-
ents' watchful eyes and presence left as well.
Second, in the name of protecting the "rights" of children and
troubled or troublesome populations like the emotionally dis-
turbed against "arbitrary" authority, legislators, courts, and policy-
makers weakened the authority of socializing and controlling insti-
tutions-not much, but just enough to unsettle things. Whether it
was the authority of parents ("You can't spank me"), teachers
("You can't make me cover up my 'school sucks' slogan on my tee-
shirt"), the juvenile court ("You can't stop me from running
away"), or psychiatrists ("You can't make me take medication"),
"rights" trumped both responsibility and control. In the past, a
teacher's insistence that a child cover an objectionable slogan was
non-negotiable; now, a teacher's perseverance meant he could be
sued. Likewise, incorrigible residents of public housing had their
rights: short of committing felonies against their neighbors (and
often even this was not enough) these troublesome tenants could
not be evicted by housing authorities. Like teachers, housing au-
thorities were so "chilled" by the prospect of long and expensive
litigation that they walked away from problems. Like many
schools, large public housing projects spun out of control.
The good news was that the vast majority of young persons were
relatively unaffected by their "rights revolution": they obeyed their
38. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LiFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 32 (1961).
The first thing to understand is that the public peace-the sidewalk and
street peace-of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police
are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of vol-
untary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced
by the people themselves .... No amount of police can enforce civilization
where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down.
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parents and were respectful to teachers and authority figures.
However, for "wannabes '' 39 and real predators, newfound rights
were made to order. Intimidation, extortion, and "in your face"
confrontations were not only to be tolerated, but in the legal lore
that was fueled by social "science," they were elevated to expres-
sions of cultural diversity that should "enrich" their victims. The
trouble with this formulation was that although it was a popular
notion with intellectual elites and the media, it did not play well in
neighborhoods, especially poor and minority neighborhoods. The
idea, for example, that prostitution was a "victimless crime" was a
cruel joke to inner-city families whose husbands were being hustled
in front of their children by scantily clad prostitutes and whose
daughters were being propositioned obscenely on their way to high
school by cruising "Johns." To use Norman Podhoretz's phrase,
"tolerating the intolerable" became a civic duty for decent
people.4"
Meanwhile, police and agencies of control such as prosecutors
and parole agencies retreated into centralized facilities and strate-
gies. Many in policing, for example, believed that centralizing po-
lice and putting them in cars would improve their efficiency and
make them more effective. Many accepted the idea that police
should intrude into community life as little as possible. They be-
lieved: police should deal only with serious crime; youthful offend-
ers should be handled by social workers; drunkenness and other
"minor" crimes like prostitution should be decriminalized because
they were "victimless." They believed that because crime is caused
by racism, social injustice, and economic inequities, police can do
little about crime to begin with except respond to it once it occurs.
Regardless, whether driven by the quest for efficiency or adher-
ence to ideology, the outcome was the same: centralizing police
and putting them in cars virtually "de-policed" city streets, exacer-
bating the breakdown of other forms of social control.
In similar fashion, courts and prosecutors moved "downtown" as
well. Remote from neighborhoods and communities, they lost any
sense of neighborhood priorities. Like police, prosecutors wanted
to deal only with "sexy" cases: murder, rape, and robbery. Lost on
them and the courts was the reality that entire neighborhoods were
the victims of the so-called "victimless" crime. As for probation
and parole, offenders became "clients" who reported to officers in
39. Youths who are not really intent on mayhem, but who do enough posturing
and "woofing" to intimidate people.
40. Norman Podhoretz, My New York, NAT'L REV., June 14, 1999, at 41.
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downtown offices. The idea that probation and parole agents
should be active in neighborhoods and communities to control
their charges both was alien to their operating strategies and obvi-
ated by their fear of going into tough neighborhoods. Tom Wolfe
caught this pessimistic and jaded attitude just right in his The Bon-
fire of the Vanities.41
So social scientists have a point when they relate the conver-
gence of crack, guns, and high numbers of youth to the explosion
of violence during the late 1980s. They fail to acknowledge, how-
ever, that this convergence happened within the context of weak-
ened families, schools, neighborhoods, and other socializing and
controlling institutions-most resulting from policies they strongly
supported, including urban renewal, decriminalization, deinstitu-
tionalization, bussing, decreased regulation of youth, and the with-
drawal of agencies of control-especially police but not limited to
them-from neighborhoods and communities. Put concisely, the
progressive agenda for cities, so strongly supported and engineered
by political and academic liberals during the 1960s and 1970s, over-
reached itself with a commitment to radical individualism and
drained the capacity of neighborhoods and communities to manage
youth and those prone to obstreperousness. And by the late 1980s,
we lost control of public spaces, especially in poor and immigrant
neighborhoods.
Such interpretations are not just coming from the center-right of
the political spectrum. Liberals, such as Harold Meyerson, have
made very similar observations:
The creation and defense of public space is a distinctly liberal
achievement, as is the creation and defense of untrammeled civil
liberties. In practice, however, these two values have clashed
repeatedly on the sidewalks and streets of America's cities over
the past 15 years, as urban poverty and disorder have both
grown more virulent. On the whole, urban liberal regimes have
tended to defend civil liberties at the expense of public space,
just as conservatives have tended to defend market forces at the
expense of community stability. (On both the left and right, the
individualistic strain in America has been running amok for sev-
eral decades now.) Liberal urban policy has sent many city
dwellers, especially in poorer neighborhoods, scurrying in-
doors-or to ersatz malls, or the suburbs. It is the center-right
41. TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1988) (presenting a fictional
account of how an opportunistic reporter and politician inflame public opinion when
the protagonist's vehicle strikes a young African American).
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that has risen to the defense of public space in cities, and it is the
center-right that is reaping the political reward.42
In many respects, it is not surprising that all of this came to a
grinding halt in New York City, especially in the subways. The old
saying that "every conservative in New York City was a liberal who
had been mugged" may not have been literally true, but it got at
the reality that virtually no one could avoid intolerable daily con-
frontations and intimidation. The result was a growing demand for
order that even political loyalty could not suppress. Hence, the
election of a center-right politician who was prepared to reject the
crime prevention truisms of the past.
But the violence that grew out of the breakdown of community
controls affected virtually every city in the United States. And in
most, citizens decided: "enough was enough." Cities moved to re-
store control over public spaces. In many communities, prosecu-
tors and probation and parole agencies started to create a presence
in neighborhoods again. Business Improvement Districts spread
nationally. Citizen groups intensified their lobbying and anti-crime
efforts. Strong movements developed to find ways to control the
aggressive emotionally disturbed, if not with medications, then by
institutionalizing them. Housing officials demolished tower-block
high rises and built low-density, dispersed public housing, where
residents involved in the drug trade were speedily evicted. School
officials sought ways to restore order-in some cases reinstituting
mandatory school uniforms and other signs of discipline and con-
trol. Many communities started to return to neighborhood schools.
Collaboration among police, criminal justice agencies, other gov-
ernmental agencies, and the faith community not only formed in
city after city, but demonstrated remarkable persistence and effec-
tiveness. Boston was the strongest example 43-gang violence was
all but eliminated 44-but examples could be given from cities all
42. Harold Meyerson, Why Liberalism Fled the City and How it Might Come Back,
AM. PROSPECT, March-April 1998, at 46-52.
43. E.g., David M. Kennedy, Guns & Violence: Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders,
High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 461 (1997)
(discussing the success of the Boston Gun Project Working Group in dramatically
reducing gang violence in Boston). The Working Group's strategy focused not only
on traditional law enforcement, but also on informing the gang members of the conse-
quences of illegal conduct. Id. at 463-64. "The Working Group also hoped that the
process of communicating face-to-face with gangs and gang members would undercut
any feelings of anonymity and invulnerability they might have, and that a clear dem-
onstration of interagency solidarity would enhance offenders' sense that something
new and powerful was happening." Id. at 464.
44. Id.
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over the country. Courts began to rethink that balance between
individual rights and community interests. Police and prosecutors
rediscovered the power of city ordinances, zoning, and regulations
and applied them to many problems, including drug dealing and
crack houses, as well as controlling gangs.45 In other words, in
every sector, from business to faith institutions, moves were made
to undo social policies that had held crime control hostage. Steps
were taken to re-strengthen socializing and controlling institutions,
increasing their capacity to maintain order and prevent crime.
That the configurations of these movements are different in every
city should come as no surprise.
So what can I conclude?
CONCLUSION
The criminal justice policies that were derived from "root
causes" and its corollaries-decriminalization, deinstitutionaliza-
tion, and deregulation of youth-have had disastrous conse-
quences. Because crime prevention was equated with solving
society's social problems and reacting to serious crime only after it
occurred, the business of criminal justice, criminal justice policy,
and practice had no middle ground.46 Police, prosecutors, and pro-
bation and parole agents ignored minor offenses. Sanctions for mi-
nor offenses were limited or non-existent (often, merely fines that
went ignored and unpaid). On the other end, however, sanctions
for drug dealing and felonies piled up and became more and more
extreme-e.g., "three strikes you're out," "stiff time," and "truth in
sentencing." Without the inclination or authority to intervene in
minor offenses, police and criminal justice agents (add schools and
other socializing institutions as well) sent an alluring but dangerous
message to obstreperous youth: "We can't and won't control your
behavior." At the margins, a relatively small percentage but a
45. In City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the Supreme Court struck
down Chicago's anti-loitering statute on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague.
Id. at 64. The Court, however, hinted that a similar provision might be valid "if the
ordinance only applied to loitering that had an apparently harmful purpose or effect,
or possibly if it only applied to loitering by persons reasonably believed to be criminal
gang members." Id. at 62. In response to the Court's decision in Morales, Chicago
enacted a narrower, and specifically anti-gang, statute. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-
015 (rev. 2000).
46. Conservatives as well (especially the far right) were not innocent in this re-
gard-they had their own "macro" approach to explain crime control. For them,
crime was caused by the breakdown of family values which, in turn, was linked to
welfare. But they did not dominate criminal justice thinking as did liberals. Cf THE
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 1.
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huge number of youth believed this message and blissfully pushed
on, inexorably heading towards prolonged incarceration-and in
the process terrorizing communities by committing large numbers
of both minor and serious offenses. In other words, liberals like to
blame conservatives for the disastrously high levels of imprison-
ment. Yet it was the liberal disinclination to control youth as they
explored the boundaries of acceptable behavior that sent the mes-
sage that anything went, thus sending many youth careening into
serious crime and prolonged imprisonment.
To the extent that criminologists and social scientists attribute
crime to "macro" causes outside of their control-demography, ec-
onomics, social injustices-they can comfort themselves about the
role they played during the last thirty years. But bad social poli-
cies, many of them strongly supported by criminologists and soci-
ologists, got us into the crime mess, and improved policies are
getting us out of it.
The issue is not just sorting out responsibility, although it is a
first step. Aside from the coming "baby boomerang" now on the
horizon,47 prisons will be releasing vast numbers of offenders back
into neighborhoods and communities. How we think about them
and their impact on neighborhoods will influence the crime trajec-
tory in the decades to come. Clearly, they will need the services of
the educational, service, and faith communities-many desper-
ately. But controls, as well as services, change and shape behavior.
Regardless of whether we are concerned about the arrival of a
large cohort of youth or felons returning from prison, we must be
willing to make strong statements about the boundaries of behav-
ior, not just at the extremes of felonies, but with minor offenses
and obstreperousness as well. To do this we must continue to re-
strengthen the ability of families, neighborhoods, schools, and
other social institutions to control as well as nourish young people.
47. Fox, supra note 9, at 1-5.
